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ABSTRACT 
To date, there has been little work done on developing countries especially issues on 
auditor independence, audit quality, audit delays, and audit fee determinants. Even 
more scarce is studies on audit and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). As such, 
this paper is to address this imbalance by having a closer look on audit fee 
determination of SMEs in Malaysia. The main objective of this paper is to examine 
the determinants of audit fees that had been charged to SMEs. Factors that are 
hypothesized to have significant influences on audit fees are auditee’s size, auditee’s 
complexity, auditee’s risk, auditee’s profitability, and auditor’s busy period. 
Furthermore, this study also seeks to determine whether audit firms are following the 
benchmark that has been set by Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) in charging 
their clients. Multiple regression analysis was used to analyze data from annual 
reports of 70 SMEs in Malaysia for the years 2001 and 2002. The main finding of this 
study is that only auditee’s size has a significant impact in the determination of audit 
fees for SMEs organizations for the both years studied. There was no strong evidence 
to support auditee’s risk, auditee’s complexity, auditee’s profitability, and seasonality 
having any relationship with audit fees. In addition, results also show that only one-
third of auditors charged their clients lower than the minimum charges recommended 
by MIA. This paper extends the theory of audit fee determination by providing further 
insight into the factors that determine audit fees charged to SMEs. In addition, this 
study also contributes to practitioners such as audit firms, firms, and regulatory bodies 
in gauging whether MIA benchmarks have been adhered to by audit firms.     
 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
Sehingga kini, kajian berkenaan faktor penentu yuran audit amat sedikit dilakukan di 
negara-negara sedang membangun. Tambahan lagi, kajian berkaitan dengan audit dan 
Syarikat Kecil dan Sederhana (SME) adalah amat jarang. Oleh itu kajian ini 
diharapkan agar dapat memberikan sedikit panduan mengenai faktor-faktor penentu 
yuran audit bagi SME di Malaysia. Tujuan utama kajian ini adalah untuk 
mengenalpasti faktor penentu bagi kadar yuran yang dikenakan kepada SME. 
Terdapat lima faktor yang dijangka memberi kesan ke atas pengenaan kadar yuran 
audit iaitu saiz syarikat, kesukaran mengaudit sesebuah syarikat, tahap risiko syarikat, 
tahap keberuntungan syarikat dan juga tahap kesibukan juruaudit. Selain itu, kajian ini 
juga bertujuan melihat sama ada pengenaan yuran audit ke atas SME oleh firma-firma 
audit adalah mengikut garispanduan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Institut Akauntan 
Malaysia (IAM) atau tidak. Data dari laporan tahunan 70 buah syarikat SME bagi 
tahun 2001 dan 2002 telah digunakan dalam kajian ini. Keputusan yang diperolehi 
menunjukkan hanya satu faktor sahaja, iaitu saiz syarikat yang mempengaruhi yuran 
audit yang dikenakan. Faktor-faktor lain didapati tidak mempengaruhi kadar yuran 
audit yang dikenakan. Hasil kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa satu per tiga dari yuran 
audit yang dikenakan kepada SME adalah di bawah tahap minimum yang ditetapkan 
oleh IAM. Kajian ini dapat mengembangkan teori berkaitan yuran audit dengan 
memberikan petunjuk berkaitan faktor-faktor penentu yuran audit yang dikenakan 
kepada SME. Dari segi praktikal, kajian ini menyumbang kepada firma-firma audit, 
syarikat-syarikat SME, dan IAM yang bertindak sebagai agensi pengawalan dalam 
penentuan yuran audit yang adil dan bukan di bawah paras minimum yang disyorkan 
oleh pihak IAM.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The running of a firm is very much based on trust relationships. In many cases, the 
owners of the corporation would have to rely on management in running the business. 
Hence, the owners put their trust on management in the hope that management would 
act in their best interests, which is to increase their wealth and preserving the 
continuity of the business. This phenomenon is usually referred to as agency theory 
and is defined as: 
“a contract under which one party (the principal) engages another party (the 
agent) to perform some service on the principal’s behalf” (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976 in Godfrey, Hodgson, Holmes, & Kam, 1992, p. 236-237). 
 
Nevertheless, this owner-agent trust relationship might be broken as 
management might act in their own best interests instead of the owners who have 
deployed their capital into the business (Madura, 2003). This is formally known as the 
agency problem (Godfrey et. al., 1992). This agency problem gives rise to three 
agency costs but we are only interested in one which is the monitoring costs (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976 in Godfrey et. al., 1992). These monitoring costs refer to costs 
associated with monitoring the agent’s behavior (Godfrey et. al., 1992). 
Thus, this raises the issue for an external party to keep management in check 
and to ensure that procedures and policies are in place to protect the interest of the 
owners. Inadvertently, this is exactly why auditors are employed by their clients. 
Corporate governance, a formal term in ensuring that the running of the business is at 
par to a normal organization in terms of integrity and transparency, is the very 
underpinning of audits and the existence of audit firms.   
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The understanding of audit fee determination is pertinent to suppliers and 
customers of the audit services industry (Che-Ahmad & Houghton, 1996). 
Furthermore, the pricing of these fees is also important to market regulators as 
previous studies have shown audit services might not be priced competitively due to 
high concentration of the number of accounting firms (Che-Ahmad & Houghton, 
1996). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that for a competitive pricing of audit fees, 
these charges should be closely related to audit quality which refers to the quality of 
audit service being provided to customers (Che-Ahmad & Houghton, 1996). 
However, Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) through its guidelines (MIA By-
Law) has also mentioned that the client should not be charged a fee that is too low as 
it can impair the quality of the audit performed.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Although there have been numerous studies on audit fee determination, most of these 
have been conducted using data in developed countries (Simon, Teo, & Trompeter, 
1992). To date, there has been little work done on developing countries especially 
issues on auditor independence, audit quality, audit delays, and audit fee determinants 
(Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996; Cobbin, 2002). As such, this paper is to address this 
imbalance by having a closer look on audit fee determination in Malaysia. 
 More interestingly, this paper targets small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in Malaysia as they play a significant role in the development process of the 
national economy (Hashim, 2000; Abu Bakar, Smith, & Sapuan, 1997). SMEs 
contribute in many ways to the national economy such as in terms of business units, 
employment opportunities, economic output, regional income generation, savings, 
training, stimulation of competition, aiding large firms, introduction of innovation, 
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and as a foundation for growth (Hashim, 1999; 2000; Abu Bakar et. al, 1997). 
Nevertheless, studies involving SMEs are still very limited. As such, this paper hopes 
to redress this issue and to further emphasize the role of SMEs in Malaysia by looking 
into the determination of audit fees being charged to SMEs and the compliance to 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) Guidelines. In other words, this study 
addresses the issue that SMEs are important to the economy and therefore, should be 
well-managed. Consequently, a regulatory element such as subjecting SMEs to audits 
and charging audit fees according to proper guidelines is needed. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
Specifically, this paper aims: 
(1) to examine the amount of audit fees that had been charged by audit 
firm to SMEs;  
(2) to examine factors that  determine the audit fees charged by audit 
firms;  
(3) to determine whether MIA benchmarks are adhered to in determining 
audit fees by audit firms (i.e. whether the audit firms are charging audit 
fee below the MIA benchmark); and 
(4) to examine whether audit fee charges differ according to the factors 
determined.  
 
 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
As such, this paper would be able address questions such as: 
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(1) What is the range of audit fees charged by audit firms to SMEs in 
Malaysia?; 
(2) What are the organizational factors that influenced the amount of audit 
fees for SMEs in Malaysia?; 
(3) Are the determinants consistent with previous research or specific to 
SMEs?;   
(4) Are the audit firms charging their services (audit fees) to SMEs within 
the accepted MIA benchmark?; 
(5) Do audit fees differ according to the factors determined? 
 
1.5 Definition of Key Terms 
Audit fees can be defined as the amount of fee that had been charged by audit firms 
for the audit services performed.  
   
1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study has theoretical and practical implications. This research will extend theory 
by providing further insight on the factors that determine audit fees charged to SMEs. 
Furthermore, this study is able to provide whether audit fees do indeed differ 
according to the factors determined to affect audit fees.  
This paper is able to contribute to practitioners such as audit firms, firms and 
especially regulatory bodies in gauging whether MIA benchmarks have been adhered 
to by audit firms.   
 
1.7 Organization of Remaining Chapters 
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The remaining chapters of this research are organized as follows. Chapter 2 will 
concentrate on the review of previous studies on the determination of audit fees. This 
section will outline the theoretical framework, identify the variables, and develop the 
hypotheses to be tested for this study. Subsequently, Chapter 3 will describe the 
methodology used in this research which is using secondary data (i.e. annual reports) 
of SMEs in Malaysia in determining audit fees charged. Chapter 4 will proceed with 
the analysis of the data and the discussion of the results. Finally, Chapter 5 will 
recapitulate the findings of the study, implications and limitations of the study, and 
pose some direction for future research. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This section will discuss the relevant literature related to the topic at hand and present 
the theoretical framework for this study. In addition, justifications will be provided for 
the variables chosen and the relationships between these variables. Furthermore, 
testing of these variables and relationships are also given in the form of hypotheses 
for testing. 
  
2.2 Review of the Literature 
Audit fees can be defined as the price charged for the audit services by audit firms 
(Che-Ahmad & Houghton, 1996). More specifically, audit fees as defined by the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA): 
“… based upon the degree of responsibilities, risk and skill involved and the 
time necessarily occupied on the work by the partner and staff in terms of the 
quality and level of competence required to meet auditing standards and 
statutory compliance with reference to the size, complexity and technical input 
expected of the audit assignment” (p. 33).  
 
MIA By-Laws also provide that audit fee for professional auditing services be 
based on the actual value of the work that has been done and is measured on four 
dimensions: 
(1) the level of expertise and the knowledge needed in completing the 
related task; 
(2) the level of training and experience of the individual engaging in the 
auditing work; 
(3) period needed by each individual in completing their task; and 
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(4) the level of responsibilities and the importance of the auditing work 
done (By-Law B-6.1, p. 29). 
MIA through its By-Law had recommended a basis for practitioners especially 
audit firms to determine minimum charge-out rates for the audit services that had 
been performed on their clients :- 
a) Gross Turnover or Total Assets Basis  
Gross Assets or Turnover for every ringgit (RM) of    Rate (%) 
The first       100,000    0.8 
The next      150,000    0.35 
The next       250,000    0.25 
The next      500,000    0.15 
The next    1,500,000    0.10 
The next    2,500,000    0.08 
 The next     5,000,000    0.075 
 The next    10,000,000    Negotiable 
 
b) Total Operating Expenditure Basis 
Total Expenditure for every ringgit (RM) of     Rate (%) 
The first      50,000    2  
The next    150,000    1  
The next     800,000    0.5  
The next   1,000,000    0.2  
Above    2,000,000    0.1 
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As we can see from those two bases i.e. Gross Turnover or Total Assets, and 
Total Operating Expenditure, the MIA guideline is applicable for those companies 
that have gross turnover, total assets and total operating expenditure less than 
RM10,000,000 as the rate for the amount exceeding RM10, 000,000 is negotiable.  
As for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), there is still no universally 
accepted definition (Hashim & Ahmad, 2001). Nevertheless, in general, SMEs in 
Malaysia are defined according to fixed quantitative criteria such as a number of 
employees, amount of capital, amount of assets, and amount of sales turnover 
(Hashim & Ahmad, 2001). However, a generally accepted definition of SMEs in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector is proposed by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) as: 
i. A small-scale firm is a company “with less than 50 full time 
employees, and with an annual turnover of not more than RM10 
million.” 
ii. A medium-scale enterprise is a company “with between 51 and 150 
employees, and with an annual turnover of between RM10 million and 
RM25 million.” 
As stated previously, an external party such as audit firms is needed to ensure 
that management is working in the best interests of the owners. Nevertheless, auditors 
should also be subjected to a set of guiding principles in ensuring that the audit done 
is of quality and recognized professionally. Hence, accounting and auditing standards 
of a high and internationally acceptable quality contribute to promoting relevant and 
reliable financial information useful to a wide range of users for decision-making 
purposes (A Statement of the Technical Committee of the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions, 2002). Auditor independence requirements also contribute 
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to promoting investor confidence in published financial statements, irrespective of 
whether such requirements are the responsibility of securities regulators in their 
jurisdictions (A Statement of the Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, 2002). While any consideration of the 
effectiveness of external audits involves a wide variety of issues, it is fundamental to 
public confidence in the reliability of financial statements that external auditors 
operate, and are seen to operate, in an environment that supports objective decision-
making on key issues having a material effect on financial statements (A Statement of 
the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, 2002). Put differently, the auditors must be independent in both fact 
and appearance (A Statement of the Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, 2002). Thus, the standards of independence 
for auditors should be designed to promote an environment in which the auditor is 
free from any influence, interest, or relationship that might impair professional 
judgment or objectivity or, in the view of a reasonable investor, might impair 
professional judgment objectivity (A Statement of the Technical Committee of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2002).  
Another matter of concern for ensuring that audit fees are charged according 
to MIA guidelines is the avoidance of low-balling activities which is charging audit 
fees significantly below cost (Kanodia & Mukherji, 1994; Schatzberg, 1990; Magee 
& Tseng, 1990). This practice is not supported by regulatory bodies as it has a 
negative impact on auditor independence and audit quality itself (Kanodia & 
Mukherji, 1994; Schatzberg, 1990; Magee & Tseng, 1990). Hence, it would be of 
value to investigate whether audit firms for SMEs are using this “low introductory 
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pricing” or “predatory pricing” (Lee & Gu, 1998) in their determination of audit fees 
charged. 
Currently, research on developing countries related to determinants of audit 
fees are scarce, nevertheless, studies on companies being audited such as SMEs are 
even more rare. As such, it is the aim of this paper to examine further the 
determination of audit fees for client companies which are SMEs. 
 
2.2.1 Organizational Factors Influencing Audit Fees 
Based on previous research, several organizational factors have been identified in 
influencing audit fees and each of these variables is discussed separately in the 
following subsections.  
 
2.2.1.1 Auditee’s Size 
The most consistent result in all previous research has been that auditee’s size is the 
most significant explanatory variable in determining audit fees (Waresul Karim & 
Moizer, 1996; DeAngelo, 1981 in Simon & Taylor, 2002; Curry & Peel, 1998; Davis, 
Ricchiute, & Trompeter, 1993; Simon & Taylor, 2002; Pong & Whittington, 1994, 
Joshi & Al-Bastaki, 2000; Chung & Narasimhan, 2002; Ho & Ng, 1996; Wilson, 
2003; Ezzamel, Gwilliam, & Holland, 2002; Matthews & Peel, 2003; Zhang & 
Myrteza, 1996; Barber, Brooks, & Ricks, 1987). Chung and Narasimhan (2002) in 
their international study on audit fees found that client size accounted as a major 
determinant in audit fees charged to organizations. Wilson (2003) using samples of 
energy firms also replicated the result that firm size is positively related to audit fee. 
More interestingly, a time-series analysis using UK companies on the antecedents of 
audit fees found that corporate size was the major determinant of audit fees 100 years 
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ago and still is the key factor of audit fee determination as of today (Matthews & Peel, 
2003). The review of five major studies on audit fee determination in the United 
Kingdom showed that audit size was the most significant variable in explaining audit 
fees by using either total assets (Simunic, 1980 in Francis, 1984; Taylor & Baker, 
1981 in Francis, 1984; Francis, 1984; Simon, 1985 in Simon & Francis, 1988; Simon 
& Francis, 1988; Butterworth & Houghton, 1995; Davis et al., 1993), sales (Ezzamel 
et. al, 2002; Taffler & Ramalinggam, 1982 in Matthews & Peel, 2003) or both sales 
and total assets (Elliot & Korpi, 1978 in Anderson & Zeghal, 1994 ; Firth, 1985 in 
Butterworth & Houghton, 1995; Chan, Ezzamel & Gwilliam, 1993 in Chung & 
Narasimhan, 2002) as proxies for auditee size.  
In another study, Ho and Ng (1996) in determining factors impacting audit 
fees in Hong Kong found that size was a major predictor and measure this variable in 
two measures of assets and sales. The findings of this research were also replicated in 
a study on municipal audit fees (Rubin, 1988) which found a significant positive 
relation of organization size and audit fee. Also from a public sector view, Deis and 
Giroux (1996) found that larger public sector organizations were positively related to 
both the price of the audit engagement and audit hours. This is because they require 
more independent audit time due to more financial transactions (Deis & Giroux, 
1996). In addition, this study concluded that auditor loss exposure was also a 
significant audit fee determinant. In another paper on Norwegian companies listed on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange, audit firm size measured as total assets was found to the 
major significant factor in influencing audit fees (Firth, 1997). Hence, this variable is 
studied in this paper in regards to audit fees for SMEs. 
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2.2.1.2 Auditee’s Complexity 
In addition, another major variable in explaining the variance between audit fee 
charges was the organizational complexity of the client firm (Davis et al., 1993). 
Audit fees were shown to vary according to number of subsidiaries (Taylor & Baker, 
1981 in Francis, 1984; Francis, 1984; Francis & Stokes, 1986 in Francis & Simon, 
1987; Palmrose, 1986 in Francis & Simon, 1987; Francis & Simon, 1987; Simon & 
Francis, 1988; Butterworth & Houghton, 1995; Pong & Whittington, 1994; Davis et 
al., 1993; Wilson, 2003; Ezzamel et. al., 2002), the ratio of auditee’s receivables 
and/or inventories to the auditee’s total assets (Simunic, 1980 in Francis, 1984; 
Simon, 1985 in Simon & Francis, 1988; Firth, 1985 in Butterworth & Houghton, 
1995; Francis & Stokes, 1986 in Francis & Simon, 1987; Simon & Francis, 1988; 
Simon & Taylor, 2002), and audit fee diversification (Simunic, 1980 in Francis, 1984; 
Chan et al, 1993 in Chung & Narasimhan, 2002). In these studies, organizational 
complexity was found to be positively related to audit fee determination (Curry & 
Peel, 1998). Nevertheless, Firth (1997) found that organizational complexity was 
related to audit fees but this relationship was rather weak or insignificant. Still, since 
this variable was studied rigorously in previous studies, it would be used in this 
research as well.  
 
2.2.1.3 Auditee’s Risk 
In most studies, there was also the variable of auditee’s risk that plays a major role in 
the determination of audit fees (Che-Ahmad & Houghton, 1996; O’Sullivan, 1999; 
Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996; Curry & Peel, 1998; Simon & Taylor, 2002). This 
meant that companies that were making accounting losses could be expected to 
represent a higher risk because of the implied lack of cash flow and thus, increase the 
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probable inability to pay the auditing firm (Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996). The 
auditee’s risk is very much related to another variable that has been separated in some 
research whereas in some others, this has been grouped as one variable which is 
auditee profitability. Walker and Casterella (2000) using data from over 3,000 
companies in the United States, found that auditors are managing their exposure to 
audit risk based on the auditee’s risk or auditee profitability by adjusting audit fees. 
However, Davis et al. (1993) used opinion type as a proxy for risk as it measured this 
variable in terms of the loss that will be incurred if an unqualified audit opinion is 
issued inappropriately. They further argue that this measure more closely reflects 
auditors’ actual perception of risk but are aware that the assessment of risk in this 
manner is more subjective in nature compared to more quantitative measures. This 
variable is also included in this paper as a determining factor of audit fees for SMEs. 
 
2.2.1.4 Auditee’s Profitabilty 
A study by Che-Ahmad and Houghton (1996) using a matched-pair sampling 
technique to overcome a serious methodological flaw and found that auditee’s size, 
complexity, and risk were all significant in influencing audit fees. In another paper to 
establish whether board and audit committee characteristics influenced auditors’ 
pricing decisions, O’Sullivan (1999) found that there was no evidence of this 
relationship but reaffirmed that audit fees were predominantly influenced by the size, 
complexity, and risk of the audit client. Yet in another study on audit effort, audit fees 
and the provision of nonaudit services to audit clients, Davis et al. (1993) replicated 
previous research results of client size, audit complexity and risk to be correlated with 
audit fees. A study using Middle Eastern listed companies also found that size, risk, 
complexity, and profitability of client operations to be significantly associated with 
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audit fees (Joshi & Al-Bastaki, 2000). Hence, auditor’s profitability is another 
important factor in influencing audit fees and is used in this paper. 
 
2.2.1.5 Seasonality  
Chan et al. (1993) in Chung and Narasimhan (2002) showed that there is a difference 
in audit work performed during the “busy season” and “non-busy season”. This led to 
the conclusion that audit firms would charge a premium for the busy season (Waresul 
Karim & Moizer, 1996). Consequently, it is expected that companies with accounting 
periods ending during the busy season would be expected to pay a premium for the 
audit services provided. Hence, this variable is captured in a dummy variable whereby 
the value of one is the busy season and the value of zero as the non-busy season. 
 It is argued that this variable is difficult to capture for SMEs as many SMEs 
are audited by numerous audit firms. This is different for large companies as they are 
more likely to choose from the Big Four and therefore, the tracking of busy and non-
busy season for these audit firms are easily attainable.  
However discussion with Ms Lee Phaik Im, Penang Branch Manager for 
KPMG, Mr. Lok Char Lee, Partner of Tan Chong & partners, and Mr. Ng Swee 
Weng, partner of KPMG has come to conclusion that a busy period for audit firms 
normally between November to March. Moreover, Ahmad and Derashid (1996) used 
the period between November and March as an indicator for busy season for auditors 
in Malaysia in their research. Consequently, this variable will be used according to the 
definition of busy season in Che Ahmad and Derashid (1996). 
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2.2.1.6 Auditor’s Size 
An alternative view was postulated by Klein and Leffler (1981) in Deis and Giroux 
(1996) that brand name development or reputation is very important for assessing 
audit quality and consequently, audit fees. This point was further emphasized by 
Simunic and Stein (1987) in Deis and Giroux (1996) who argued that credibility of 
audit services with external financial statement users which is closely related to an 
auditor’s reputation is among the antecedents of audit quality. A study on 1484 
Australian publicly listed companies also found that auditor brand name reputations 
associated with the Big 8 auditors were positively related to audit fee premium 
(Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995). Furthermore, Deis and Giroux (1996) in a study 
on Texas independent school districts found that brand name and industry experience 
were positively related to audit fees. 
Gul (1999) using Hong Kong market data provided evidence in support of 
bigger and well-established audit firms such as the Big 6 charged higher audit prices 
compared to non-Big 6 firms because of product differentiation and competition. A 
study on UK companies also found further support for auditor’s size having a positive 
impact on audit fees (Ezzamel et. al., 2002). This result is replicated using a set of 
New Zealand companies which showed that Big 5 were receiving fee premiums 
compared to non-Big 5 or obscure audit firms (Johnson, Walker, & Westergaard, 
1995).  
Nevertheless, Willekens and Achmadi (2003) using Belgian data for small 
private cliental showed that there were no price premium charged by large auditing 
firms compared to smaller auditing firms. This result was also repeated using Korean 
listed companies whereby Big 6 auditors were found to be not different in audit 
quality compared to non-Big 6 auditing firms (Jeong & Rho, 2004). Chaney, Jeter, 
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and Shivakumar (2004) found that for private firms, they do not view the Big 5 
auditors as providing superior audit quality and therefore, do not warrant a fee 
premium for these auditors. Moreover, for SMEs, there are numerous small and 
medium sized auditors that are doing the audit work for them and consequently, it is 
difficult to track the size of these auditors. Hence, this variable will not be included in 
this research because of difficulty in data collection.  
 
2.2.1.7 Government Ownership 
In developing countries, it is hypothesized that government ownership is the main 
influence on ownership structures (Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996). It is argued that 
companies that are wholly owned by governments have been criticized for not being 
audited in depth because there is little pressure for higher quality audits (Waresul 
Karim & Moizer, 1996). Thus, it is hypothesized that companies with higher 
percentages of government ownership will pay significantly lower amounts of audit 
fees than companies owned by the private sector (Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996). 
 Nevertheless, it is argued that governments are interested in controlling 
companies that play an extensive role in the national economy and security and 
therefore, would rather have ownership in large companies in certain industries such 
as in Malaysia the utilities and  telecommunications industries. Hence, since SMEs 
are small-medium sized in nature, these companies are usually owned by private 
investors and are thus, highly unlikely to be owned by the government. Consequently, 
it would not be of importance to investigate the relationship between government 
ownership and audit fees determination for SMEs as it is irrelevant in this case.  
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2.2.1.8 Auditor’s Size and International Link 
Rubin (1988) using a framework similar to Simunic (1980) in Francis (1984) argued 
that auditor size can be measured by whether a firm is one of the Big Eight auditing 
firms. It was further hypothesized that Big Eight firms are found to be associated with 
significantly higher audit fees. This relationship was supported by Firth (1997) that 
measured auditor size using the Big Six (formerly the Big Eight) whereby it was 
shown that the Big Six firms have consistently charged a premium over other 
accounting firms for both small and large size clients. Waresul Karim and Moizer 
(1996) provided an explanation for this relationship as the Big Six have access to 
higher quality staff and use higher quality procedures and so are more likely to detect 
errors and omissions. In addition, Waresul Karim and Moizer (1996) argued that 
because of the Big Six’s size, they were also better able to withstand pressure from 
client company management and so are more likely to act in an independent fashion, 
which consequently, increases the confidence of their auditing quality. Curry and Peel 
(1998) also argued in their paper using neural networks in predicting the cross-
sectional variation in corporate audit fees that the Big Six do charge a superior 
(differential) for their services compared to their smaller counterparts. In previous 
research, a binary variable is used to denote whether an auditing firm is one of the Big 
Six or otherwise (1 = a Big Six firm, 0 = a non-Big Six firm).  
However in this case, this relationship will not be tested as more than 90% of 
the sample has been audited by non Big Six audit firms. Hence, although this 
relationship can be tested, it is argued that because of the limited size of the sample, 
this proportion might not be representative for the whole population.     
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2.2.1.9 Employment of Qualified Accountant(s) 
It is hypothesized that many companies in developing countries are run by unqualified 
accountants (Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996). As such, it is argued that companies 
with qualified accountants are more likely to have better internal control systems and 
therefore, produce accounts containing fewer errors than companies with only 
unqualified accountants (Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996). Hence, it is expected that 
companies with qualified accountants be charged a lower audit fee as internal controls 
are better. This variable was captured through a binary variable whereby the client 
firm with qualified accountant(s) would be coded as one and those firms without 
qualified accountant(s) would be coded as zero. 
This relationship is again not tested in this study as the information on whether 
an SME employs a qualified accountant(s) or otherwise is difficult to be ascertained. 
This is because most of the information on SMEs especially internal information 
about the companies are very restricted and kept confidential to the respective 
companies. As such, the attempts to even obtain the financial report directly from the 
companies have been very unfruitful and thus, any attempts to obtain information 
such as internal auditors through questionnaires would be seen as more frustrating and 
more difficult to be attained.   
 
2.2.1.10 Financial or Non-Financial Company 
It is found that audits of financial companies (banks and insurance companies) are 
different in nature from those of non-financial companies, as principally both sets of 
companies present different audit challenges (Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996). It is 
difficult to hypothesize whether financial companies would have higher or lower audit 
fees as financial companies typically have a rather simpler asset structures, but they 
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tend to have more offices and hence have more elements requiring an audit (Waresul 
Karim & Moizer, 1996). A dummy variable was used to measure this element with 
the value of one if the company belonged to the financial sector and zero if otherwise. 
Nevertheless, this relationship would not be investigated here as according to 
the SMIDEC (Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation) database of 
SMEs, there is no information on SMEs which are in the financial sector. As such, the 
information of financial SMEs companies is unable to be ascertained. 
    On a more macro or international view, Taylor and Simon (1999) collected 
audit fee data from 20 countries and found that increased litigation pressures, 
institutional traditions of increased disclosure, and increased regulation had a positive 
relationship with audit fees.  
In addition, there has also been research investigating the contract type as an 
important component audit fees and hours. More specifically, it is found that under 
fixed fee contracting as opposed to cost-reimbursement, audit fees are lower but audit 
hours are unaffected with the choice of contracting (Palmrose, 1989).  
Nevertheless, from the numerous previous researches, many have stated that 
there are three key determinations of audit fees which are the auditee’s size, 
organizational complexity of the client firm, and the auditee’s risk (Maher, Tiessen, 
Colson, & Broman, 1992; O’Keefe, Simunic, & Stein, 1994; Zhang & Myrteza, 
1996). However, as for seeking the determinants of audit fees in a developing country 
context, Waresul Karim and Moizer (1996) have added auditee profitability as a 
separate variable, government ownership, date of year end, auditor size and 
international link, employment of qualified accountants, active trading, 
multinationality, financial or non-financial company, language of annual report, and 
number of languages used in the annual report. Some of these variables have been 
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discussed above, nevertheless in the context of SMEs, the active trading and 
multinationality variables would be deleted as these are irrelevant for these small 
firms. Furthermore, in the Malaysian context, the variables of “language of annual 
report” and “number of languages used in the annual report” would be irrelevant 
because nearly all annual reports are reported in both English and Malay languages 
and thus, these variables would have, if any, an insignificant influence on audit fees. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
This paper seeks to examine the antecedents of audit fees and thus, a model is 
hypothesized to be able to explain the varying audit fee charges. As discussed in the 
previous section, the variables and relationships studied in this paper can outline in a 
model for testing: 
LNAFeei = b0 + b1Sizei + b2Complexityi + b3Riski + b4Profitabityi + 
b5Seasonalityi +  
where: LNAFeei =  Audit fees charged to auditee i (Natural Log transformed) 
  Sizei  =  size of auditee i (Natural log of Total assets) 
 Complexityi =  complexity of auditee i (ratio of Inventories and Receivable  
   over Total assets) 
 Riski  =  risk of auditee i (Long term debt over total assets) 
 Profitabityi =  profitability of auidtee i (Return on Total asset (ROTA)) 
 Seasonalityi =  busy period for auditor or not (coded 0/1) 
  =  error term (assumed to be normally distributed) 
This model is very similar to Joshi and al-Bastaki (2000) for their research on 
determinants of audit fees for companies listed in Bahrain Stock Exchange. 
 
 21 
2.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is obviously the audit fees charged by the 
auditing firms to their clients. This variable is measured in terms of ringgit. 
 
2.3.2 Independent Variables 
As stated, there are five independent variables in this study whereby four are 
continuous variables and one is a nominal variable. Each variable and their 
hypothesized relationship with the dependent variable are discussed below. 
 
2.3.2.1 Auditee’s Size 
As stated, the most significant factor in determining audit fees is the client firm’s size. 
The relationship between auditee’s size and audit fees is hypothesized to be a positive 
relationship and total assets will proxy for size. 
H1: The larger the auditee size, the higher the audit fees. 
 In addition, a test will also be conducted to examine whether audit fees 
differ according to audit firm size. This is done by recoding the data on audit firm size 
and is tested through the following hypothesis: 
H6:  Mean of audit fees for small firms differ from the mean of audit fees for 
large firms.  
 
2.3.2.2 Auditee’s Complexity 
Curry and Peel (1998) stated that the complexity of the audit is hypothesized to 
increase the level of the audit work since increased auditee complexity increased the 
risk of the audit failure. Furthermore, the complexity of the audit may be affected by 
the organizational characteristics of the auditee (e.g the degree of decentralization); 
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the degree of diversification; and the difficulty of auditing the assets held by the 
clients (e.g relatively large values of debtors and stock). Waresul Karim and Moizer 
(1996) stated that the amount of audit effort expended can be expected to increase 
with the increased complexity of the audit task which in turn is likely to lead to 
increased audit fees. Complexity costs will be a reflection of the nature of the 
business of the auditee, its location, the quality of its internal control and the 
proportion of unusual transactions. Thus, the relationship between auditee complexity 
and audit fees are hypothesized to be positive as well. 
H2: The higher the auditee complexity, the higher the audit fees. 
The proportion of total assets represented by inventories and receivables is 
used as a measure of auditee complexity compared to number of subsidiaries as due to 
their nature of size, SMEs are not inherently having many subsidiaries.  
 Furthermore, the means of audit fees for those having high complexity and 
low complexity will be tested to ascertain whether they differ or otherwise. 
H7:  Mean of audit fees for low complexity firms differ from the mean of audit 
fees for high complexity firms. 
  
2.3.2.3 Auditee’s Risk 
Curry and Peel (1998) hypothesized that auditee risk affects the level of audit fees for 
two reasons. Firstly, increased client risk increases the risk of audit failure and 
therefore a higher level of audit testing will be required. Secondly, the auditor will 
charge a higher fee, commensurate with the perceived risk (of audit failure) associated 
with the audit and/or to cover the cost of higher indemnity insurance against audit 
failure. Five measurements for audit risk have been identified in previous research 
such as the ratios total liabilities to total assets, long-term debt to total assets, working 
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capital to total assets, current assets to currents liabilities, and current assets less stock 
to current liabilities. Thus, auditee risk is hypothesized to have a positive relationship 
with audit fees. 
Most of the previous researcher used long-term debt to total assets ratio as a 
measure for risk (Chaney et. al., 2004; Craswell et. al., 1995; Curry & Peel, 1998; 
Firth, 1997; Gul, 1999; Joshi & Al-Bastaki, 2000; O’Sullivan, 1999; Wilson, 2003). 
Therefore, a long-term debt to total assets ratio will be used as proxies for auditee risk 
as most of the previous researcher used this measure for the proxy of risk.  
H3: The higher the auditee risk, the higher the audit fees.  
 It is also interesting to test whether high risk firms do indeed are charged with 
different fees compared to low risk firms. This can be examine through the testing of 
this hypothesis: 
H8:  Mean of audit fees for low risk firms differ from the mean of audit fees for 
high risk firms. 
 
2.3.2.4 Auditee’s Profitability 
Curry and Peel (1998) stated that the auditee’s ‘ability to pay’ might influence the 
amount auditors’ charge; that is; higher corporate profitability (ability to pay) may be 
positively correlated audit fees. There were 3 measures that always been used to 
measure audit profitability: Return on Capital employed (ROCE), return on Total 
assets (ROTA), and return on sales (ROSAL).  
According to Waresul Karim and Moizer (1996), the effect of auditee 
profitability is hard to assess because there are two possible opposite effects. Greater 
profitability could mean that the company is less concerned with individual overheads 
and hence the audit fee could be higher. Alternatively, low profitability could be 
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associated with financial pressure which could require increased audit work to verify 
the value of assets and to confirm that the company was a going concern. Hence, low 
profitability could also be associated with higher fees. Thus, due to the conflicting 
nature of the relationship between auditee profitability and audit fee, the relationship 
hypothesized is that there is an association between auditee profitability and audit fee. 
ROTA will be use as a proxy for this variable. 
H4: Auditee profitability is related to audit fees. 
 Another test relating to profitability is ascertaining whether high profitability 
firms are charged different audit fees compared to low profitability firms. This is 
tested by comparing the means of the two groups. 
H9:  Mean of audit fees for low profitability firms differ from the mean of audit 
fees for high profitability firms. 
 
2.3.2.5 Seasonality (Date of Year End) 
It is believed that busy and non-busy season influence auditors in charging the audit 
fees. Date of financial year end for auditee (coded 1 for busy and 0 for non busy) will 
be proxies for seasonality.  
H5: Higher audit fees during busy season compared to non-busy season.  
 Seasonality is also tested to see whether audit fees differ according to the 
season that they are audited. Specifically, this is tested through this hypothesis: 
H10: Mean of audit fees for busy season differ from the mean of audit fees for    
          non-busy season.  
 
 
 
